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Heckscher-Ohlin theory is codiﬁed by four central propositions. The ﬁrst
is the Heckscher-Ohlin Theorem itself; a country tends to export the goods
that use intensively the factors with which it is abundantly endowed. The
second is the Factor Price Equalization Theorem; international trade tends
to bring factor prices closer together, and thus a locally abundant factor that
is globally scarce will beneﬁt from trade. The third is the Stolper-Samuelson
Theorem; changes in goods prices magnify changes in factor prices. The
fourth is the Rybczynski Theorem; at ﬁxed factor goods prices and thus
ﬁxed factor prices, changes in endowments magnify changes in outputs.
In my opinion (and perhaps Samuelson’s [15] too), the deepest aspect of
Heckscher-Ohlin theory is the reciprocity relationship inherent in the dual-
ity between the Stolper-Samuelson and the Rybczynski theorems. An econ-
omy’s Rybczynski effects are described by the Hessian of its national rev-
enue function, and its Stopler Samuelson effects are just the transpose of
that matrix. When one speaks of the effect that a rise in the price of apples
has on the wage rate, one is also describing exactly how the supply of apples
will change when the supply of workers increase, for ﬁxed factor prices.
But a Rybczynski effect is really a local effect. It depends on the local
technology, and it has nothing to do with international trade per se. There is
nothing in trade theory requiring–and there is absolutely no empirical evi-
dence suggesting–that countries have identical technologies. So the simplest
form of Heckscher-Ohlin paradigm that we teach routinely is an uninterest-
ing theoretical construct with no empirical foundation.
Once one admits that countries have different technologies, then the fun-
damental question becomes, “How can one best describe factor productivity
differences between countries?” The usual tack is to posit factor-speciﬁc
technical difference or Hicks-neutral total factor productivity differences or
a combination of both. None of these adjustments is general in theory, and
none of them actually works empirically. So the whole ﬁeld is searching for
an elegant way to describe these differences.
I describe them using factor conversion matrices. They are a general-
ization of the insight of Brecher and Choudhri [2], who described a model
with three goods and two factors where all three goods were produced. They
noted that goods prices would adjust so that every good would be produced
for a give set of factor prices. Helpman [11] extended there work, and I
will show how it generalizes. But the key insight is that typically many of
the same goods are produced and traded in every country. This fact implies
that there is an interesting and empirically robust relationship between factor
2prices and technologies in different countries.
Here is how one constructs a factor conversion matrix. Consider an in-
crease in the foreign endowment when goods prices are ﬁxed. This will give
rise to marginal changes in the vector of foreign output. Then compute the
local factor content of these foreign Rybczynski effects. This linear mapping
is the factor conversion matrix.
Here is another interpretation of a factor conversion matrix. My work
starts from the presumption that trade equalizes goods prices, but it will
not equalize factor prices except in the most unusual circumstances. One is
immediately interested in how local factor prices translate into foreign ones.
The answer to this question is the transpose of the factor conversion matrix.
One way to reconcile Heckscher-Ohlin theory with the data is to use
Fisher and Marshall’s [6] artiﬁce of a virtual endowment. This construct
begins by choosing a reference country. Then it takes the actual output of
each country and computes what factors would be necessary to produce that
output using the technology of the reference country. In essence, a list of
virtual endowments assumes that the assumptions of classical trade theory
hold true when technologies and factor prices are identical to those of the
reference country. Using these virtual endowments, one makes a theoretical
prediction about the factor content of trade measured according to the ref-
erence country’s technology. In empirical applications, this construct works
remarkably well.
In fact, there is a deep relationship between a county’s virtual endow-
ment and the factor conversion matrix. A country’s virtual endowment is
its productivity-adjusted actual endowment plus an error term that depends
on the reference country’s technology. The local factor content of this error
term is zero, but its factor content in the reference country may differ from
zero.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. In the second section, I
willsketchoutthepreliminariesanddescribethefactorpricenon-equalization
relationship. The third section explores more deeply what factor content re-
ally means when countries have different technologies. The fourth section
gives a series of increasingly complex examples showing the usefulness of
factor conversion matrices. The ﬁfth section presents some brief conclusions
and an exhortation for future research.
32 Preliminaries
There are n goods and f factors. Let the f 1 vector w denote factor prices.
The description of production is an n  f technology matrix:
A(w)
whose rows correspond to goods and columns to factors. The canonical ele-
ment aij denotes the unit input requirement of factor j in the production of
good i. In classical trade theory, the mapping A(:) is assumed to be identical
for all countries. For ﬁxed factor prices, the rows of A(w) deﬁne factors uses
for each good, and the convex combination of these rows is called the diver-
siﬁcation cones. If the economy’s endowment lies in that cone, then it can
produce positive amounts of all goods and employ its factors fully. If there
are more goods than factors, then there is an n   f dimensional subspace
of output that satisﬁes the full employment condition (when the technology
matrix has full rank).
SomeauthorssuchasSchott[16]andandRomalis[14]haveemphasized
that countries seem to produce goods in different cones of diversiﬁcation. In
essence, countries produce different goods depending upon what their factor
endowments are. This is a plausible explanation for the lack of factor price
equalization that is obvious in the data, but it ignores the important fact that
countries produce and trade every good, deﬁned at the level of aggregation
for the data used in empirical studies. It may be the case that countries pro-
duce a particular good using very different techniques, but it is not true that
countries trade different subsets of goods. The taxonomy of macroeconomic
accounts is just too coarse readily to conﬁrm readily these ideas.
The columns of A(w) have an interesting interpretation too. They deﬁne
a region that I shall call the goods price diversiﬁcation cone. If commodity
prices p lie in that region, then there non-negative factor prices w such that
A(w)w = p
There is an extensive empirical literature showing that countries have differ-
ent technologies. Implicit in that literature is the fact that countries manage
to produce (and trade) almost every good at the usual level of aggregation
for national accounts. The empirical literature that emphasizes that countries
produced in different cones of diversiﬁcation tends to ignore this important
empirical fact. Perhaps it is more appropriate to state that this literature im-
plicitly assumes that countries actually produce different goods, even though
they are classiﬁed as identical in national income accounts.
42.1 Common prices
It is natural to study a model where
Ai(wi)wi = p = Aj(wj)wj; (1)
where perhaps Ai(:) 6= Aj(:) or wi 6= wj or both. If the former is true,
then we are assuming that the the two countries have fundamentally different
technologies, and if the latter is true, then we are abandoning the assumption
of uni-valence explored by Gale and Nikaido [8], Chipman [3], and others.
This equation is a formalization of Schott’s [17] observation that countries
almost never specialize at an industry level.
I hope it is not too much of a distraction to call the relationship in (1) the
phenomenon of factor price non-equalization. This equation captures what
I consider the two most salient aspects of the data: (1) countries’ technolo-
gies are different; and (2) all goods are produced and traded everywhere. I
would argue that the main distraction from a more complete understanding
of Heckscher-Ohlin theory has been an undue ﬁxation on factor price equal-
ization and the assumption of identical technologies. My aim in this paper
is to free the profession from these psychological fetters.
Let us assume that both countries are competitive in both goods; this is
equivalent to assuming that the intersection of the two goods price diversiﬁ-
cation cones is not empty. In particular, I am assuming that for some goods
prices p, there exist local factor prices such that the two systems of equations
implicit in (1) have solutions.
Equation (1) pushes Bernhofen’s [1] logic to the extreme; it underscores
that tests based upon countries being in different endowment diversiﬁcation
cones may not be warranted. Studying unit values for highly disaggregated
goods, Schott [17] and Hallak [9] both might argue that there are systematic
quality differences in some goods classiﬁed as identical in trade statistics.
Of course, equation (1) is a statement about prices, not unit values. Also,
rhis equation also abstracts from trade costs, but I have shown elsewhere [6]
that trade costs are not a signiﬁcant deterrent to trade at the two-digit level
of aggregation.
Consider ﬁxed Leontief technology matrices Ai and Aj. The set of pos-
sible world prices that allow every good to be produced in both countries is
the intersection of two f-dimensional cones deﬁned by column spaces of Ai
and Aj. For a ﬁxed p in that sub-space,
wi = A+
i p + (I   A+
i Ai)zi
for some zi 2 Rf. In this expression A+
i is the Moore-Penrose pseudo-
inverse of the technology matrix of Country i.
5It is important to emphasize that this expression gives the set of all possi-
ble factor prices in Country i that are consistent with observed goods prices
p. It consists of a particular solution and a homogeneous term. The homo-
geneous term in this expression I  A+
i Ai is the aspect of local factor prices
that has nothing to do with goods prices. This term can differ from zero
only if there more factors than goods or if the local technology matrix is not
of full rank. If f > n, then local factor supplies usually pin down factor
prices. (These kinds of considerations are of course extraneous in a study of
the relationship between goods prices and factors prices.) If the local tech-
nology matrix does not have full rank, then either at least two goods use all
factors in the same proportions or two factors are used by all industries in
the same proportion. Both of these cases are of little general interest to a
trade theorist, and I will not pursue them in this paper. Indeed, it is often the
case that
I   A+
i Ai = 0;
a fact that I will assume in the rest of my discussion. It is certainly true
in almost all empirical applications, since macroeconomic accounts usually
record a much larger number of goods than factors.
Comparing factor productivities across countries is essentially the study
of factor price differences. There is no elegant way to model factor pro-
ductivity differences across countries, but the fact that almost every country
seems to be able to produce almost every good and trade it on world markets
has important implications for trade theory. Since p = Ajwj
wi = A+
i Ajwj + (I   A+
i Ai)zi: (2)
Fisher and Marshall [6] call the transpose of the f  f matrix A+
i Aj in (2)
the factor conversion matrix. It maps factor prices in country j into those in
country i.
Each column of A+
i Aj shows how the corresponding factor price in
country j maps onto all the factor prices in country i. The factor conver-
sion matrix is a linear mapping, and it takes into account how the factor uses
in country j project most immediately onto those in country i. Leontief’s
[12] idea of factor-speciﬁc technical differences corresponds to the special
case where the factor conversion matrix is diagonal. In empirical applica-
tions, its off-diagonal elements are large, and there is no theoretical reason
to restrict it in this manner.
62.2 Local prices differ
Imagine that each country had different local technologies and different lo-
cal prices.1 Trade costs or idiosyncratic local monopoly markups might still
allow prices to be roughly comparable across borders. We could consider a
model where
pi + ui = p = pj + uj;
where pi are local prices, ui is akin to measurement error and p are common
world prices. Then
wi = A+
i wj + A+
i vij; (3)
where vij =  ui+uj. Equation (3) states that factor prices in country j can
be related bilaterally with those in country i, up to some measurement error
that depends upon local conditions in each country. In the usual case where





the projection matrix used by econometricians. Hence A+
i Aj is given by
estimating a system of seemingly unrelated regressions without constants.
Each column of Aj–representing a factor’s use in every sector in country
j–is regressed against all the factor uses in every sector in country i. The
coefﬁcients from this regression form the column of A+
i Aj that shows how
a factor price in country j maps onto all the factor prices in country i.
The residuals from those regressions are estimates of how important bi-
lateral price differences are for factor productivity comparisons. Since the
seemingly unrelated regressions all have the same right hand variables–the
technology matrix of country i–ordinary least squares is consistent. Hence
one could get a sense of how important deviations of local prices from
world prices are in determining factor productivity differences across pairs
of countries. This exercise has a little of the ﬂavor of what [5] have done, but
it uses all the information in two countries technology matrices to estimate
the f2 parameters that completely characterize productivity differences in a
linear system. This is exactly the technique that Fisher and Marshal [6] use
to solve the mystery of missing trade.
3 What does factor content really mean?
If countries produce and manage to trade every good in spite of having fun-
damentally different technologies, then local technologies adapt to interna-
1This subsection was inspired by a referee’s comments.
7tional economic conditions, at least in the long run. But then the services of
a unit of capital in the local economy may have very little to do with those
of a trading partner. Hence the very deﬁnition of the factor content becomes
problematic.




where vi is the local vector of endowments and where we have imposed the
full employment condition. But what the factor content of this output vector
from the point of view of some reference country 0? It is natural to deﬁne:
~ vi = AT
0 yi:
Notice that the reference country’s virtual endowment is its actual endow-
ment. The same fact is true for any country that has an identical technology
with that of the reference country. Fisher and Marshall [6] deﬁne ~ vi as coun-
try i’s virtual endowment when the technology matrix A0 is the reference.
Using a reference country allows meaningful international comparisons of
factor services. In essence it answers this question, What would the endow-
ments of every country be if the world actually satisﬁed the assumptions of
Heckscher-Ohlin theory and were viewed through the lens of a reference
country’s technology?
There is nothing radical about this deﬁnition. For example, Davis and
Weinstein [5] begin their exploration of the factor content by deﬁning a
world average technology matrix, a concept that has little theoretical co-
herence. Any author trying to test Heckscher-Ohlin theory has to come up
with some proxy for a world technology, and we are using a deﬁnition that
is theoretically cogent and also rationalizes the data.
A virtual endowment can be related to the factor conversion matrix.
Since AT
i yi = vi, we may write
yi = (AT
i )+vi + (I   (AT
i )+AT
i )zi (4)
for some zi 2 Rn. In the usual empirical case where the number of goods
exceeds the number of factors, the actual output yi may not correspond to
the particular solution in (4), but any difference will have net local factor
content of zero. The economic intuition is that every production possibility
frontier in an economy with more goods than factors will have ﬂats along
which the factor content of output is identical. The mathematics follows
from the fact that the homogeneous part of (4) projects onto the null space
of AT
i so the term zi uses no extra local factors on net.
8Hence the virtual endowment is:
~ vi = AT
0 (AT
i )+vi + ui (5)
where ui = AT
0 (I   (AT
i )+AT
i )zi is the factor content in the reference
country of the difference between the actual output in country 1 and the
particular solution to (4). Again ui has no factor content in country i, but it
may have factor content in the reference.
A country’s national income satisﬁes this relation:
pTyi = pT(AT
i )+vi + pT(I   (AT
i )+AT
i )zi
where again zi is chosen as the difference between the particular solution






i )zi = 0
since the expression in parentheses projects onto the null space of the AT
i .
The economic intuition is that any output on a ﬂat of the local production
possibility frontier has the same national revenue. In other words, the error
term in (5) consists of the factor content in the reference country of a vector
of output in Country i that is orthogonal to world prices.
This observation offers a theoretical and empirical advantage. Consider
factor prices w0 in the reference country. Note that
wT
0 ~ vi = pT(AT
i )+vi = pTyi:
where I have used (4) and the fact that wT
0 AT
0 = pT. Hence a country’s
virtual endowment evaluated at factor prices in the reference country gives
its actual GDP.
Let world output be y =
P
i yi, and the world’s virtual endowment be
~ v =
P




If factor prices w0 in the reference country are observable, then the actual
GDP shares in the world economy can be computed easily from a list of
virtual endowments. Hence empirical implementations of these ideas are
simple and also theoretically consistent.
We close this section with a fundamental theoretical observation. The
transpose of the factor conversion matrix deﬁned in (2) is the local factor
content in country j of the Rybczynski matrix in country i. It is worth writ-
ing this fact explicitly
(A+
i Aj)T = AT
j (AT
i )+ (6)
9where I have used the symmetry property of the Moore-Penrose pseudo-
inverse (AT
i )+ = (A+
i )T. In sum, the factor conversion matrix is both the
onlytheoreticallycogentwayofrelatingfactorpricesincountryj withthose
in country i and its transpose is the factor content in country j of country
i0s Rybczynski matrix.
4 Examples
This section will present a sequence of increasingly complicated examples
that illustrate the fundamental concepts described above. Each case will
consider world economies that consist of two countries. All of my exam-
ples will use Leontief technology matrices. But of course, every technology
matrix has ﬁxed coefﬁcients when one is only considering small changes in
factor prices. Likewise, Rybczynski effects make sense only when goods
prices and thus factor prices are ﬁxed. So every one of my examples is more
general than will appear at ﬁrst glance.
4.1 A Ricardian model
There are three goods and one factor of production. Let the technology for


















These technologies were obviously chosen so that every country could pro-
duce every good. In particular, no country has comparative advantage in
anything, but the ﬁrst country has an absolute advantage in everything. In
particular the intersection of the two price diversiﬁcation cones is the ray in














10In other words, wages in the ﬁrst country are ten times higher than in the
second; this fact reﬂects exactly the productivity differences between coun-
tries.
What about the dual of this productivity difference? Consider a marginal
increase in the endowment of the ﬁrst country. It is typical to say that the
local Rybczynski effect is not deﬁned because there are more goods than
factors. In this case, it does not matter where this extra labor is put to work.
In Country 2, the factor content of the marginal output produced in any
sector in Country 1 would be ten Country 2 workers.
4.2 The Textbook 2  2 Model







Again, rows correspond to goods and columns to factors. From now on, the
ﬁrst column corresponds to capital and the second to labor. I am assuming a
technology with ﬁxed coefﬁcients; the unit input requirements are indepen-
dent of factor prices. The ﬁrst good is locally labor-intensive, and the second






where all the variables are analogous.















One can read the (local Country 1) Rybczynski effects immediately from
A+
1 : capital is an enemy of good 1; and labor is an enemy of good 2. In this
simple case, the Moore-Penrose pseudo-inverse is just the usual inverse of
the technology matrix. Also, factor prices in Country 2 map into those in
















These are Leontief’s factor-speciﬁc technology differences, and they are
never in the data.2
2Maskus and Nishioka [13] ﬁnd evidence of factor-augmenting technical differences that are
correlated with factor endowments.
11Consider again the dual interpretation of this matrix. Imagine a unit
increase in the endowment of capital in Country 1. Now the Rybczynski
effect is unique, and it can be read directly from the ﬁrst row of A+
1 : the
output of the ﬁrst (locally labor-intensive) sector contracts by one unit; and
the output of the second (locally capital-intensive) sector increases by one
unit. The local factor content in Country 2 of these output changes 10 units
of capital, exactly as it should be.
Now consider Country 1’s virtual endowment, when Country 2 is the






Then its virtual endowment would be:







In fact, these are exactly the endowment adjustments that [18] posited. It is
obvious that each unit of capital in Country 1 is ten times as productive as
a unit of capital in Country 2; likewise, workers in Country 1 are twice as
productive as those in Country 2.
I hope I have convinced you that the factor conversion matrix makes
sense. Now I will introduce an interesting generic theoretical case that is
actually typical of the data. No one has ever discussed these kinds of factor














The technology matrix of Country 2 differs only slightly from the ﬁrst case.3















3There are many topologies on the space of matrices, and each is induced by a vector norm.
The 1-norm focuses on differences in factor-speciﬁc productivities, the 1-norm on total factor
productivity by industry, and the 2-norm (spectral norm) and the Frobenius norms focus on aspects
of both kinds of technical differences. In this case kA2   A3k1 = 1, kA2   A3k1 = 1, and
kA2   A3k2 = 1. On the other hand, kA1   A2k2  32:5 So the slight difference between A2
and A3 is well within the usual measurement error.
12The small differences in technology have been chosen so that two diver-
siﬁcation cones–those for endowments and prices– are large enough so that
both countries can produce both goods and employ all their factors. One
need not be afraid of the negative off-diagonal element in the factor conver-
sion matrix. For example, if factor prices in Country 2 are w2 = (0:1;0:5)T,
then goods prices are p = (3:1;3:5)T and factor prices in Country 1 are
w1 = (0:4;2:3)T Since these linear mapping are continuous, there is an
open set of goods prices such that factor prices in both countries are strictly
positive. In the ﬁrst case, capital was seen to be ten times as productive in
Country 1; now rents in Country 1 are only four times higher than those in
Country 2. In the ﬁrst case, wages were twice as high in Country 1; now they
are more than four times higher than in Country 2. Fix goods prices. Then
small changes in technology gives rise to big changes in factor prices–the
magniﬁcation effect in a different guise.
How can a seeming increase in the productivity of labor in sector 2 ac-
tually result in a measured decrease in the wage in Country 2 relative to that
in Country 1? The answer is that factor-speciﬁc productivity comparisons
only make sense in very special cases. These cases are not at all generic in
theory, and they do not hold in the data.
For a trade theorist it is natural to recognize that measured labor produc-
tivity actually depends on the general equilibrium structure of the economy.
The difference between the ﬁrst and the second cases in this subsection is
that capital becomes slightly less productive and labor slightly more produc-
tive. Hence total factor productivity has decreased in sector 1 and increased
in sector 2 in that country. An increase in total factor productivity is identical
to a local price increase for that sector, since more revenue is earned with the
same factor inputs. Thus the factor prices effects in Country 2 combine two
Stolper-Samuleson effects: (1) a decrease in the local wage and an increase
in the local rentals rate because TFP has decreased in the labor-intensive sec-
tor 1; and (2) a reinforcing decrease in the wage and increase in the rentals
rate because total TFP in sector 2–the capital-intensive sector–has increased.
The whole empirical literature on testing the Heckscher-Ohlin model has ig-
nored these kinds of effects.
Let us end this sub-section with an illustration of the virtual endowment
of Country 1. Again Country 2 is the reference. Now Country 1’s virtual
endowment is:
~ v1 = (A+
1 A2)Tv1 =

9  K1 + 3 L1
   K1 + 4 L1

:
Again the off-diagonal element in the factor conversion matrix might be
worrisome. But, for any endowment of Country 1 in its diversiﬁcation cone,
13thecapitallaborratioisbetweentwoandthree. Sothesecondelementofthis
virtual endowment is always positive. For example, if v1 = (250;100)T,
then ~ v1 = (2550;150)T. These endowment adjustments are what Leontief
[12] was searching for.
4.3 The Real World
In almost all empirical applications, the number of goods exceeds the num-
ber of factors, and there are at least two factors. Here is the simplest such


















These technologies were chosen so that goods prices p = (2;3;4)T lies
in the intersection of their price cones. The unique local factor prices that
correspond to these goods prices are w1 = (1;1)T and w2 = (1;2)T.


















Fisher and Marshall [7] call the tranpose of A+
1 the Rybczynski matrix for
Country 1. It is obvious that capital is the local friend of sector 3 and the
local enemy of sector 1. It is also clear that labor is the local friend of the
two most locally labor-intensive sectors and the enemy of the most capital-
intensive one. I hope it does not do too much violence to a theoretical purist
to call this one element of the supply correspondence the Rybczynsi matrix
for this country. Using the duality of the Stolper-Samuelson and Rybczyn-
ski matrices implicit in the Hessian of the national revenue function, my
colleague and I make this argument more precisely in [7].
The factor conversion matrix itself is not too controversial, since all of
its elements are positive. But I would be remiss not to emphasize again the
two central points of this paper: (1) sector-speciﬁc productivity differences
14do not make sense in general; and (2) this matrix is the unique linear map-
ping that describes factor productivity differences for all goods prices in the
intersection of the two price diversiﬁcation cones.















Again, let Country 2 be reference. Then the virtual endowment of Country
1 is:
~ v1 =
  K1=2 +  L1=3
 K1=4 +  L1=3

This virtual endowment conﬁrms that both capital and labor seem to be less
productive in Country 1 than in Country 2.
Let me close this section with a controversial example. Assume now that
prices change to p = (1:98;3;4)T; thus the prices of the ﬁrst good has fallen
slightly. This price vector no longer lies in the price diversiﬁcation cone for
County 1. Classical trade theory reminds us that there is a discontinuous
output response: Some sector must shut down. Perhaps different sectors
shut down in different countries because their technologies are not identical
But in practice, all sectors in every country continue to operate. How can
this be?
What local factor prices are a “best guess” for those that would allow
this phenomenon to occur? These are given by:






In fact ^ p1 = A1 ^ w1  (1:98;2:99;4:00)T is the vector lying in the column
space of Country 1’s technology matrix that is closest to the actual price vec-
tor. It is just the least squares projection of this vector onto the price diversi-
ﬁcation cone in Country1. The two elements of ^ w1 are the OLS estimates of
the rentals rate and wage rate that would best rationalize the observed data
on technology and goods prices!
The “best guess” is a local Stolper-Samuelson effect. The world price
of the locally label-intensive good fell by 1%, The local wage fell by 2.7%
while local rents rose by 1%. Thus changes in world prices correspond to
the usual understanding of a Stolper-Samuelson effect for local prices in the
price diversiﬁcation cone that are very near the new world prices.
I chose this price change for a reason. It corresponds to a 1% increase in
the total factor productivity of the ﬁrst sector in Country 2, a large country
15whose factor prices are ﬁxed. Hence the new world prices lie in the price
diversiﬁcation cone of the new technology matrix for that country. (Nominal
factor prices are still w2 = (1;2)T, but real income in Country 2 has risen
because the output of good 1 has increased.) Thus the factor conversion
matrix A+
1 A2 is the best guess for the local Stolper-Samuelson effects in
Country 1 of sector-speciﬁc technical progress in Country 2. These are akin
to the effects Harrigan [10] described.
5 Conclusion
This paper has has argued that factor conversion matrices are a computation-
ally simple and theoretically elegant way of comparing factor productivities
differences when countries have different technologies. The Factor Price
Equalization Theorem has been the Achilles’ heel of trade theory for too
long. But Heckscher-Ohlin theory does not really depend upon it. One can
speak about factor content, as long as one has a proper way of comparing
factors across countries. Deﬁning productivity-adjusted factors or “effec-
tive” factors is neither theoretically generic nor empirically accurate.
The factor conversion matrix is the local factor content of the foreign
Rybczynksi effects. Its transpose is the unique linear mapping that translates
local factor prices into foreign ones for all world prices in the intersection of
the price diversiﬁcation cones.
Fisher and Marshall [6] already have applied these ideas empirically to
good effect. Once one admits that the most banal form of Heckscher-Ohlin
theory does not ﬁt the data, one has to come up with a new theoretical pre-
diction.4 That prediction has to deal forthrightly with adjustments to factor
productivities across countries. I know this is a harsh statement, but I have
shown clearly here that one can make appropriate theoretical predictions
using factor conversion matrices. For example, robust tests using virtual en-
dowments have already veriﬁed all these ancillary assumptions: (1) constant
returns to scale; (2) goods prices are equalized across countries; (3) there is
no home bias in consumption; (4) preferences are identical and homothetic;
(5) there is no home bias in consumption; and (6) it is not necessary to as-
sume that some goods are not traded.
Once one appreciates that Heckscher-Ohlin theory applies to local tech-
nologies, one can make appropriate empirical predictions. Skill-biased tech-
nical change may raise wages of local skilled workers and raise wages of un-
4The work of Choi and Krishna [4] is a step in the right direction, but [1] casts doubt on their
exact empirical ﬁndings.
16skilled workers abroad. Likewise the process of capital accumulation in one
country may increase the share of heavy industry in the local economy but
decrease it abroad. Development paths are country-speciﬁc, not universal.
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